

### On the (In)Equivalence of Impossible Differential and Zero-Correlation Distinguishers for Feisteland Skipjack-type Ciphers

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### Outline

#### Impossible Differential and Zero-Correlation Linear Distinguishers

The Distinguishers Previously Known Relation

#### Feistel and Skipjack-Type Ciphers

Constructions The Matrix Method Main Results Illustration of the Proof

#### **Examples and Conclusion**

Example of (In)Equivalence Conclusion



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
Example of (In)Equivalence Conclusion



### [Knudsen 1997]

ID distinguishers :

- Differentials which never occur
- Truncated differential  $(\Delta, \Gamma)$  with probability 0






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




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




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### [Bogdanov et al 2012]

(Multidimensional) ZC distinguishers :

- Linear approximations with probability 1/2
- Multidimensional linear approximation (U, V) with capacity 0


 $\begin{array}{c} \boldsymbol{U} \cdot \boldsymbol{P} & (0,0) \notin (\boldsymbol{U},\boldsymbol{V}) \\ \\ & \forall \boldsymbol{u} \in \boldsymbol{U}, \ \forall \boldsymbol{v} \in \boldsymbol{V}, \\ & \boldsymbol{Pr}[\boldsymbol{u} \cdot \boldsymbol{P} \oplus \boldsymbol{v} \cdot \boldsymbol{C} = 0] = \frac{1}{2} \\ \\ & \text{Or equivalently,} \\ & \boldsymbol{Cap}(\boldsymbol{U},\boldsymbol{V}) = 0 \end{array}$ 



### [Bogdanov et al 2012]

(Multidimensional) ZC distinguishers :

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




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




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
### Mathematical Relation between ID and ZC

[Blondeau Nyberg 2013]

- $\succ \mathsf{TD} : [(0, \Delta_t), (0, \Gamma_r)]_{\Delta_t \in \mathbb{F}_2^t \setminus \{0\}, \ \Gamma_r \in \mathbb{F}_2^r}$
- ► ML :  $[(U_s, 0), (V_q, 0)]_{U_s \in \mathbb{F}_2^s \setminus \{0\}, V_q \in \mathbb{F}_2^q}$  w

with probability *p* with capacity *C* 

$$\frac{2^t - 1}{2^t} \cdot p = 2^{-q} \cdot (C + 1) - 2^{-t}$$




If t = q: ZC and ID distinguishers are mathematically equivalent



# Mathematical Relation between ID and ZC

### [Blondeau Nyberg 2013]



If t = q: ZC and ID distinguishers are mathematically equivalent Observation :

Independent of the cipher and its structure

However:  $(2^t - 1)(2^{n-t} - 1) \approx 2^n$  IDs are involved

In practice, the considered spaces are smaller



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Example of (In)Equivalence Conclusion



# **ID and ZC Distinguishers**

#### Number of Rounds of the Distinguisher:

Ciphers	ID	ZC
LBlock / TWINE	14	14
MARS	11	11
SMS4	11	11
Skipjack	24	17
Skipjack (only rule A)	16	16
Four-Cell	18	12



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
### Example of Patterns (for LBlock) :


- Impossible differential :
  - $(0000000, 00 \Delta 00000) \nrightarrow (0 \Gamma 000000, 00000000)$
- ► Zero correlation approximation : (000 U0000, 0000000) → (0000000, 0 V000000)




# **Example of Constructions**










#### Skipjack-Type






EGNF-Type









- F-layer
- X-layer
- P-layer























### **Rules to find ZC and ID distinguishers**

### Differential Context :

#### Linear Context :



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
### Differential Context :

#### Linear Context :

⊕ and • "play orthogonal roles"




### **Mirror Round Function**



- $\mathcal{M}$  is the matrix representation of the mirror round function
- In general  $\mathcal{M}^T \neq \mathcal{R}$
- Used to find ZC distinguishers [Soleimany Nyberg 2013]




# **Example of ID distinguisher**








### Example of ZC distinguisher









# **Matrix Method**

### Impossible Differential Context :

- Truncated input difference  $\Delta$
- Truncated output difference Г
- ▶ If there is an inconsistency between  $\mathbb{R}^m \cdot \Delta$  and  $\mathbb{R}^{-\ell} \cdot \Gamma$ , we have an ID on  $m + \ell$  rounds

### Zero-Correlation Context :

- Truncated input mask U
- Truncated output mask V
- ▶ If there is an inconsistency between  $\mathcal{M}^m \cdot U$  and  $\mathcal{M}^{-\ell} \cdot V$ , we have a ZC on  $m + \ell$  rounds



### Equivalence between ID and ZC distinguishers

If it exists a linear relation between  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{R}$  or  $\mathcal{R}^{-1}$ , the existence of an ID distinguisher involving M differentials is equivalent to the existence of a ZC distinguisher involving M linear masks.

Given  $\ensuremath{\mathcal{Q}}$  a permutation matrix, the relation is

• Feistel-type ( $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F}$ ) :

$$\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$$
 or  $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$ 

• Skipjack-type ( $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{F}$ ):


$$\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1} \text{ or } \mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$$

• EGFN-type ( $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{F}$ ) :


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 or  $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$  or  $\mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{M}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$ 



### Illustration of the Proof for a Type-I Feistel




Inverse function






### Illustration of the Proof for a Type-I Feistel



 $(\alpha, \beta, \delta, \gamma) \rightarrow (\alpha, \delta, \gamma, \beta)$ 




## Illustration of the Proof for a Type-I Feistel





#### Round function




 $\mathcal{R}=\mathcal{P}\cdot\mathcal{X}\cdot\mathcal{F}$ 




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
$$\mathcal{R}^{-1} = \mathcal{F}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$
$$= \mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}_*^{-1}$$

$$\mathcal{F}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$

$$\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$



#### Round function





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
Inverse function

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
 $\mathcal{R}=\mathcal{P}\cdot\mathcal{X}\cdot\mathcal{F}$ 

Exchange the order of the operations






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 $\mathcal{R}=\mathcal{P}\cdot\mathcal{X}\cdot\mathcal{F}$ 


Exchange the order of the operations



Inverse function

$$\begin{split} \mathcal{R}^{-1} &= \mathcal{F}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1} \\ &= \mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}_*^{-1} \end{split}$$

#### Equivalent formulation





$$\mathcal{F}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$

$$\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$



#### **Round function**





Inverse function

$$\mathcal{F}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$

$$\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$

 $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{F}$ 


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


```
\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1}
```

$$\mathcal{R}^{-1} = \mathcal{F}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$
$$= \mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{X}_*^{-1}$$

#### Equivalent formulation Permutation of the branches







 $\mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot (\mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}) \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1}$ 



#### Round function






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$$\mathcal{F}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$


$$\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}$$

 $\mathcal{R}=\mathcal{P}\cdot\mathcal{X}\cdot\mathcal{F}$ 


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


#### Equivalent formulation Permutation of the branches



 $\mathcal{X}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1}$ 





 $\mathcal{P}^{-1} \cdot (\mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{X}_*^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}^{-1}) \cdot \mathcal{F}_*^{-1}$ 

The inverse function is "equivalent" to the mirror function



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
#### **Examples and Conclusion**

Example of (In)Equivalence Conclusion



### **Example of Equivalence**

Round Function of the Twine Block Cipher:



 $\mathcal{P}$  defined from  $\pi = \{5, 0, 1, 4, 7, 12, 3, 8, 13, 6, 9, 2, 15, 10, 11, 14\}$ 

We have  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{Q} \cdot \mathcal{R} \cdot \mathcal{Q}^{-1}$  for  $\mathcal{Q}$  defined from

 $\gamma = \{16, 15, 12, 11, 14, 13, 10, 9, 8, 7, 4, 3, 6, 5, 2, 1\}$ 



### **Example of Inequivalence**

Some of the Feistels of [Suzaki et al 2010]

For instance 
$$\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{P} \cdot \mathcal{F}$$
 with  $\mathcal{F} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\ F & 1 & & 0 & 0 \\ & & \cdots & & \\ 0 & 0 & & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & & F & 1 \end{pmatrix}$ 

and  $\mathcal{P}$  is defined from  $\pi = \{1, 2, 9, 4, 11, 6, 7, 8, 5, 12, 13, 10, 3, 0\}$ 




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and  $\mathcal{P}$  is defined from  $\pi = \{1, 2, 9, 4, 11, 6, 7, 8, 5, 12, 13, 10, 3, 0\}$ 

- The original Skipjack (ID: 24 rounds, ZC: 17 rounds)
  - Rule-B followed by Rule-A is equivalent to





### Conclusions

- We provide condition of equivalence between ID and ZC distinguishers for different cipher constructions (Feistel-type, Skipjack-type, EGFN-type, ··· )
- The results can be generalized to other constructions
- This relation can be taken into consideration when designing a cipher

Is there a link between the key-recovery attacks?

