

# **Preliminary Analysis of the Concept Concept Inventory with some Theoretical and Methodological Background**

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**ConChAMo**

Conceptual Change Research workshop  
Hanasaari, Helsinki, Finland  
22<sup>nd</sup> of August, 2012

# Background 1:

## Artificial Intelligence Paradigms and Underlying Epistemological Assumptions


# Traditional AI viewpoint

Agents

Language

Model of the world


World




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“...the World as  
Earthquake...”

Stellan Ohlsson, 22.8.2012

# Emergentist viewpoint


(importance of pattern recognition and learning)

Agents

Language

Model of the world



World



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


Complex  
Dynamic

## Background 2:

### Self-Organizing Map as a

- Method of Data Analysis and Visualization, and
  - Model of (Conceptual) Learning



The most influential  
neural network  
model in the category of  
unsupervised learning

(Book: 1995, 1997, 2001;  
Original publication: 1982)

“...population of competing demons...”

Stellan Ohlsson, 22.8.2012

- Concept instance
- A pheno by being



Voilà:

Basic learning principles of the **Self-Organizing Map** model:

1. An input vector  $\mathbf{x}_t$  is compared with all the model vectors  $m_{i(t)}$ .

The best-matching unit (node) on the map, i.e., the node where the model vector is most similar to the input vector in some metric is identified. This best matching unit is often called the **winner**.

2. The model vectors of the winner and a number of its neighboring nodes in the array are changed towards the input vector according to the learning principle...




**Competition**

(and collaboration  
between the “neighbors”)



# Modeling communities of linguistic and conceptual systems



(Lindh-Knuutila, Lagus, Honkela, 2006)

Background 3:

Modeling Conceptual  
Subjectivity

# Intersubjective Concept Spaces

(Honkela, Könönen, Lindh-Knuutila & Paukkeri 2008)

$C_i$ : N-dimensional  
metric **concept  
space**

$S$ : symbol space,  
The **vocabulary** of an  
agent that consists of  
discrete symbols

$\lambda : C_i \times C_j \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, i \neq j$   
A **distance** between  
two points in the  
**concept spaces** of  
different agents

$\xi: s_i \in S_i \rightarrow C$   
An individual  
**mapping function**  
**from symbols to**  
**concepts**

$\varphi_i: S_i \rightarrow D$   
An individual  
**mapping from agent**  
**i's vocabulary to the**  
**signal space D** and  
an inverse mapping  
 $\varphi^{-1}_i$  from the signal  
space to the symbol  
space




Observing  $f_1$  and after symbol  
selection process, agent 1  
communicates a symbol  $s^*$   
to agent 2 as signal  $d$ . When agent  
2 observes  $d$ , it maps it to some  
 $s_2 \in S_2$  by using the function  $\varphi^{-1}_1$ .  
Then it maps the symbol to some  
point in its concept space by using  
 $\xi_2$ . If this point is close to its  
observation  $f_2$  in the sense of  $\lambda$ ,  
the communication process has  
succeeded.



**Extension of information theory**

# Applying Utility in Concept Learning




Timo Honkela and Juha Winter. Simulating language learning in community of agents using self-organizing maps. Computer and Information Science Report A71, Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki, Finland, December 2003.

# GICA – Grounded Intersubjective Concept Analysis

Timo Honkela, Juha Raitio, Krista Lagus, Ilari T. Nieminen, Nina Honkela, and Mika Pantzar. Subjects, objects and contexts: Using GICA method to quantify epistemological subjectivity. In Proceedings of IJCNN 2012, International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2875–2883.

# Subjectifying: adding subjective views into object-context matrices



Outcome: Subject-Object-Context (SOC) Tensors



“The Beef of this Talk”:

Preliminary Analysis  
of the Concept Concept Inventory

# Concept Concept Inventory (1/2)


(Lappi & Rusanen)

	Yes	No
* 1. Do concepts exist?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 2. Do concepts exist independently of the activity of the human mind?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 3. Are concepts inside the heads (brains) of individuals?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 4. Are concepts mental representations?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 5. Are concepts mental images?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 6. Are concepts linguistic representations?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 7. Are concepts prototypes or exemplars?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 8. Are concepts abstract objects that have no material properties?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 9. Are concepts private or subjective – i.e. each person has his or her own concepts which may be more or less similar (but not identical) to those of others?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 10. Are concepts public – i.e. can the same concept be shared by more than one individual?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 11. Are concepts first and foremost entities that can be used to categorize the world of experience?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 12. Are concepts first and foremost entities that can be used refer to entities in the physical world?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 13. Are concepts first and foremost entities that make rational thinking about abstract objects possible?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 14. Does concept possession for putative natural kind concepts (e.g. having the concept CAT) entail ability to discriminate the object (being able to tell whether something is a cat or not)?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 15. Are norms governing the proper application of a concept based on the concept use of the individual?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 16. Are norms governing the proper application of a concept based on the concept use of the language community?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
* 17. If a lay person uses a concept of gravity or a concept of energy, is he using the concepts of gravity and energy of physical theory?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>


# Concept Concept Inventory (2/2)

- |  |                       |                       |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| * 18. If a physical sciences uses a concept of gravity or a concept of energy, is he using the concepts of gravity and energy of physical theory?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 19. Does concept possession for abstract concepts (e.g having the concept RECURSION) entail ability to discriminate the object (telling whether a definition or a computational operation is "recursive")? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 20. Are (some) concepts innate?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 21. Are (all) concepts culturally transmitted and learned?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 22. Are folk concepts qualitatively different from scientific concepts?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 23. Is there a gradual continuum between folk concepts and scientific concepts?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 24. Are (some) scientific concept such that no single individual can fully grasp them?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 25. Do folk concepts form a coherent ontological taxonomy of the world?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 26. Is having concepts a uniquely human capability (not found in any other animals)?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 27. Is a natural language (Finnish, English, Greek...) necessary for concept possession?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 28. Is some type of symbol language (arithmetic using Arabic numerals, Prolog, first order predicate logic...) necessary for concept possession?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 29. Are concepts concrete symbols that represent (causal or abstract) relations?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 30. Do (all) concepts have internal structure?   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 31. Must (all) concepts always have conceptual/inferential relations to other concepts? (Or is it possible to possess isolated or fragmented concepts?)  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 32. Are concepts productive? (I.e. can an endless number of new complex concepts be created from existing concepts, by some operation of concept combination?)   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 33. Are concepts compositional? (I.e. is the identity of a concept determined "without residue" from its constituent parts and their mode of combination).   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 34. Are some concepts related a priori?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| * 35. Are all relations among concepts a posteriori – determined empirically?  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

# Map of People




Exist?



Independently?




Insideheads?




Mentalrepres?




Mentalimages?




Linguisticrepres?




Prototypes?



Abstract?




Subjective?




Public?




Categorizing?



Referring?




Rational?



Discrimination?



Individualnorms?




Communitynorms?




Lay?




Scientific?




Recursive?




Innate?




Cultural?




Folk?



Gradual?



Nosingle?



Coherent?




Human?



Language?



Symbol?



Concrete?



Internalstructure?




Relations?



Productive?




Compositional?




Apriori?



Aposteriori?




Rational?




13. Are concepts first and foremost entities that make rational thinking about abstract objects possible?

Internal structure?




30. Do (all) concepts have internal structure?

Discrimination?




14. Does concept possession for putative natural kind concepts (e.g. having the concept CAT) entail ability to discriminate the object (being able to tell whether something is a cat or not)?

Recursive?



19. Does concept possession for abstract concepts (e.g. having the concept RECURSION) entail ability to discriminate the object (telling whether a definition or a computational operation is “recursive”)?

Relations?



31. Must (all) concepts always have conceptual/inferential relations to other concepts? (Or is it possible to possess isolated or fragmented concepts?)

<https://elomake.helsinki.fi/lomakkeet/36617/lomake.html>